

## ENGLAND AND THE WAR.

### WEAKNESS OF BRITISH LIBERALS.

LACKING THE COURAGE OF THEIR OPINIONS—NO ACTION IN PARLIAMENT—MR. GLADSTONE THE ONLY LEADER—HIS WEAKNESS—A MOTION TO ABOLISH FLOGGING IN THE NAVY.

[FROM THE REGULAR CORRESPONDENT OF THE TRIBUNE.]  
LONDON, April 14.—It has been what is called a lively week in Parliament, winding up with a long debate last night on the Protocol and the Eastern question generally. But what has come of it all? The one satisfactory incident is the debate and division on Mr. P. A. Taylor's motion to abolish flogging in the navy. The motion was not carried, indeed, but it was defeated by a majority so narrow that its future success is assured, and its success against this future is probable. The agitation against this surviving barbarity has already produced its effect by rendering it uncommon instead of common. Only 14 men were flogged last year; seven off-hand, seven by courts-martial.

Mr. Taylor, in this as in other matters, has shown so much tact and good sense as to conciliate the House, the majority of which is almost always against him. The House dislikes what are called annual motions. It dislikes humanitarianism. It dislikes radicalism. Its most influential and numerous body of members, considered without reference to politics, dislike especially any attack upon the privileges of land-owners. Mr. Taylor, however, has managed to run steadily counter to all these prejudices, and acquire at the same time a steadily-increasing popularity and reputation.

To come to the debate on the Eastern question, there is sufficient reason for its barrenness. The Liberal party is in the lamentable condition of not knowing its own mind nor the mind of the country. It has no policy, no cohesion, no leader. I mean to do no injustice to Lord Hartington. He has shown himself an able man when he was believed to be when he was lifted into the place he now occupies. He is certainly quite competent to hold his own against Sir Stafford Northcote, whose reputation has, on the whole, declined a little since he took up the mantle which Mr. Disraeli dropped on his passage to the House of Lords. But Lord Hartington is, at most, a tactician. He maneuvers according to rule and with some skill on the actual field of battle, but for conducting the operations of war on a grand scale he has given no proof of fitness. The real leader of the Liberals, so far as they have been one during the past six months, has been Mr. Gladstone. It is he who roused the opinion of the country against the Turkish advance of the Government and made a war in behalf of Turkey impossible. Unhappily, a result which leaves his clients, the Bulgarians, as much as the mercy of their Turkish oppressors as ever. It may be doubted whether Mr. Gladstone, had he been in office, would have frankly adopted the only policy which would have been really efficacious—the policy of coercion. The opinions of the Liberals, even of so mild a Liberal as Lord Hartington, are perhaps in favor of coercion, but they have not the courage of their opinions. What reason is there to suppose they would have, if in power, imposed their will on the Turks, when they dare not even attack their own Government in the House of Commons for supporting the Turks? Efforts are made to induce Lord Hartington and his comrades of the front bench to propose a direct vote of censure. One or two of the late Ministry were themselves in favor of such a course. It would have resulted, so far as the House itself is concerned, in a defeat; but it would have inspired the anti-Turkish majority in the country, and put some heart into the Liberal party. Any good general would rather endure a defeat from time to time than see his troops rust in camp. The Tories are perpetually taunting the Liberals that they would come out from behind their works and accept battle. I think the taunt is just. No direct vote of censure on the Government has been moved. Mr. Fawcett's motion of last month cannot be called such; and such as it was, a vote on it was shrunk from in a way that was most humiliating. Sir Charles Dilke did himself honor last night by his declaration that he regretted that a censure had not been proposed. But no other voice was heard in support of a policy as sagacious as bold.

It is the fashion to say that the country, which last summer drove the Government out of its intended course, has changed its mind. That I do not believe. It is less demonstrative; it may perhaps be called acquiescent, but of any active sympathy with the Government there is no proof. But what can the country do? It is used to being led, and there is no longer anybody who will lead. Speech-making and pamphleteering were all very well so long as Parliament was not sitting. But when the practical Englishman sees that the men who fomented agitation are not ready to propose anything in the House, he doesn't understand it. The people have done their part. They can't invade the House of Commons. It is not probable that a majority is, or has been, in favor of a war to coerce Turkey into decent government, or to drive the Pashas across the Bosphorus. But a majority would have supported a policy which might have attained one of those objects without a drop of blood. Mr. Gladstone's fatal weakness in foreign policy, so often shown, has been shown once more. His policy is a policy of words. But the only man who can govern this great empire when imperial questions are at issue is a man who can act. Mr. Gladstone has yet to prove that he can do that. The courage and capacity he has displayed in carrying internal reforms, in confronting hostile classes, and tramping on interests that had grown into abuses, count for nothing when the place of England in Europe has to be fought for. Lord Beaconsfield is Mr. Gladstone's superior in this, that his resolution in the pursuit of a wrong policy has distinctly increased the European power and prestige of Great Britain for the moment. His refusal to accede to the Berlin Memorandum was a surprise to the Continent. In every point of view but one the decision was wrong, but it was taken and announced in a manner which doubled the weight of England in continental councils. So of the sending the Mediterranean fleet to Besika Bay. There was something of the spirit of Palmerston in the doing of both these acts. But why is it that no Liberal seems to understand the English feeling in such matters? Mr. Gladstone will go to his grave without comprehending it.

That has all I care to say about last night's debate. If you had entered the House while it was going on, you would have seen on one side a compact and triumphant majority cheering its speakers to the echo; on the other, half a dozen scattered and dispirited cliques—all that is left of a once powerful and well organized party. "The trouble with you Liberals," remarked a Tory once, "that you don't know how to cheer your men." True enough always, and more true now than ever. The ruddy-faced and strong-linged young squires who crowd the back benches on the Speaker's right, don't cheer opinions; they cheer men. When Mr. Hardy is up—a man after their own hearts—it is a rolling volley of applause which follows him all through. A man on the opposite side might utter the same sentiments without this well-trained pack once giving voice to encourage him. I have heard it said that Mr. Disraeli used to have a lieutenant planted on the seat behind him, drilled to this work. He and his kind were indeed, so well drilled, that in the days when Mr. Lowe and other Admirals went the Liberal party in twain, and when Tory speeches used to be heard from Whig benches, and the Tories themselves were bursting with pent-up applause for their new allies, a motion of Mr. Disraeli's was enough to stifle every sound of approval. The discipline is equally perfect to-day; and an observer might fancy that for the purposes of Parliamentary life a superiority of brains was a distinct disadvantage. The thing wanted is perfect obedience to your party leader, and the ability to make a good deal of noise at the right time.

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## THE SCENE OF HOSTILITIES ON THE DANUBE—TURKISH LINES OF DEFENSE.



### THE RAILWAY SYSTEM OF ROUMANIA—THE RUSSIAN ADVANCE—THE DANUBE THE FIRST LINE OF TURKISH DEFENSE—THE BALKAN RANGE THE MAIN RAMPART—THE FORTRESSES—A FLANK MOVEMENT IN THE DIRECTION OF SERBIA.

At the outbreak of hostilities the two armies were about 450 miles apart. The Russian army was massed near the north-eastern frontier of Roumania, in the vicinity of Kischeneff, a town on the railroad between Odessa and Jassy. The Turkish troops were stationed at various points along the line of the Danube from Chernetz to Silistria. Between the armies was the territory of Roumania, with its railway system. Roumania is nominally a vassal of the Porte, but in reality the tool of Russia. Late in March stores and ammunition were sent by the Russians into Roumania, destined for Kahl and Belgrad, and the Russian and Roumanian railway lines were connected so that rolling stock could easily be concentrated at Jassy. The distance between Kischeneff and Jassy is about 80 miles. On Monday about 17,000 Russian troops were transferred by railway to Jassy. Within 24 hours the Russians occupied Galatz, Brailov, and Bucharest, the capital of Roumania. The distance by railway between Jassy and Galatz is about 200 miles; thence the railway continues to Bucharest, a distance of 140 miles; and thence to Giurgevo, 40 miles further, on the Danube; and thence through Bulgaria to Varna, on the Black Sea. A branch runs from Bucharest to Chernetz on the Austrian frontier. A small force of Cossacks is reported to have gone in this direction to take possession of this branch. The Russians have thus made themselves masters of the Roumanian railway system, and can mass their forces either at Chernetz or Giurgevo. The distance between Galatz and Kalarash on the Danube is about 90 miles over a good road. There is a tolerable road between Bucharest and Oltenitza, where the Danube is about 800 yards wide. At Giurgevo the width of the river is three-quarters of a mile. The natural crossing places are at Giurgevo, Oltenitza, and Kalarash, and of the three Giurgevo is the most important. Instead of storming the fortresses on the south bank of the Danube, the Russian army may make a long detour by rail to Chernetz, far away to the west, and turn the flank of the Turkish forces. It is more probable, however, that the Russians will remain on the direct road to Constantinople. The Danube is a wide and swift river, across which it will not be easy to throw a bridge of boats; but inasmuch as the line of defense is so long, the assailant will have on the whole a great advantage. The Turkish divisions will be scattered, and the assaulting army can be massed quietly and hurled suddenly in overwhelming force against the defenders at a single point. It is not probable that the Danube will be an insuperable barrier to the advance of the Russians.

The first line of the Turkish defense is, however, quite formidable. The southern bank is for the most part high, while the Roumanian is low and swampy. The Turkish towns nestle among the hills and many of them are fortified, while the Roumanian side is desolate. The Turkish fleet is mistress of the waters, and the little gunboats, each carrying a heavy gun, will have their own way upon the Danube, unless the Russians can drive them away with torpedoes, large numbers of which have been stored along the Roumanian bank. With these gunboats and monitors on the water it will be difficult for the Russian army to concentrate without escaping notice, and, moreover, the number of crossing places is limited, owing to the fact that there are very few roads in Bulgaria over which an army can march. At one of the three points named above (Oltenitza, Giurgevo, and Kalarash), or at Lom or Nikopolis, a crossing must be made, because the only available roads to the south lead from those towns. Silistria, opposite Kalarash, is strongly fortified, being protected by 11 forts or redoubts, which are either closed or effectively flanked by one another. All these works are armed with heavy Krupp guns of the best pattern. Rastchuk and Widin are also strong fortresses. If the Russians effect a crossing, they will either have to besiege these fortresses or mask them either by large bodies of men and push forward the main army. In that event, the Turks would withdraw to their second line of defense in the Balkan range. This is the main defense of Central Turkey—a great rampart which the Russians will have to scale

before they can reach Adrianople and Constantinople. These mountains are 5,000 feet high at the western extremity and 2,000 feet high at the eastern. The distance from the Danube to the top of the passes is about 50 or 60 miles, across a rough and broken country; and the declivities of the mountains themselves are clothed with forests. The climate is very cold and bleak. There are eight passes through the hills, the best ones being the most easterly one on the coast road and the Iron Gate on the road from Timova to Slivno. Between the Balkan range and the Danube there are two formidable fortresses—Shumla and Varna—each of which commands all the roads from Rastchuk and Silistria to Constantinople, and the other coast road from Dobrusha and the lower Danube. The Russian troops would be exposed to the fire of the Turkish gunboats and monitors on the coast road, and Shumla is the strongest fortress in Central Turkey. The hills which encircle it are very steep and are clothed with impenetrable underbrush, and every height is strengthened by fortifications. It is the most important point in the defensive system of Turkey; Widin, Silistria, and Varna rank next in strategic importance. Beyond the Balkan range is an undulating country sloping toward the Sea of Marmora. From Adrianople a railroad runs to Constantinople, a distance of 70 miles. Within a few miles of the Bosphorus there is a range of hills which will form a third line of defense if the Turks are driven from the river and the mountains.

While it seems probable that the Russians will make a direct advance across the Danube between Giurgevo and Kalarash, and then fight their way over the mountains to Adrianople and the Bosphorus, they may make a flank movement, crossing the Danube at Chernetz, where the river is narrow, and where the inhabitants of the opposite side are friendly, where, indeed, foras have already been thrown upon both sides of the river, under the direction of Russian engineer officers, to keep the Turkish gunboats at a distance. From this point of crossing the Russians would be able to march through Serbia by good roads, and to descend into the great road between Nish and Sofia without going through any of the Balkan passes. The whole of the second line of the Turkish defense would be turned at one stroke. In the war of 1828 the Turks crossed the river at Widin and seized Kalarash, and they may repeat this movement now. Kalarash is upon the flank of the Russian line of advance to Chernetz, and is a point of great strategic importance. All these lines of attack and defense are clearly shown in the large cut which accompanies this article.

### THE BELLIGERENTS.

#### THE MILITARY STRENGTH OF TURKEY.

In Turkey the army has been organized under regulations issued in 1871. Its ranks are entirely supplied from the Mohammedans, except in certain privileged districts, such as Albania and Bosnia, which furnish special corps of their own. In the rest of Turkey every able-bodied Mussulman of 20 years and upward is bound by law to serve in the standing army, but notwithstanding this law a young Turk of the wealthier classes can always obtain exemption from the service. The period of service is nominally 12 years; that is, four in the Nizam or standing army, two in the Redif or reserve, and six in the militia, but practically the soldier remains in time of peace only three years under the colors, and is then sent on unlimited furlough. The number of recruits levied yearly is from 30,000 to 40,000 men, about 20 per cent of whom are supplied by European Turkey, and 80 per cent by Asiatic Turkey. The total military forces of Turkey, exclusive of the "sedentary" army formed of those who have served 12 years, is as follows:

Regiments.	Infantry.	Cavalry.	Artillery.	Engineers.	Medical.	Telegraph.	Other.	Total.
1	100,000	10,000	10,000	10,000	10,000	10,000	10,000	150,000
2	100,000	10,000	10,000	10,000	10,000	10,000	10,000	150,000
3	100,000	10,000	10,000	10,000	10,000	10,000	10,000	150,000
4	100,000	10,000	10,000	10,000	10,000	10,000	10,000	150,000
5	100,000	10,000	10,000	10,000	10,000	10,000	10,000	150,000
6	100,000	10,000	10,000	10,000	10,000	10,000	10,000	150,000
7	100,000	10,000	10,000	10,000	10,000	10,000	10,000	150,000
8	100,000	10,000	10,000	10,000	10,000	10,000	10,000	150,000
9	100,000	10,000	10,000	10,000	10,000	10,000	10,000	150,000
10	100,000	10,000	10,000	10,000	10,000	10,000	10,000	150,000

guns of the horse artillery are rifled Armstrongs, but the mountain artillery has only small guns of which a whole battery produces less effect than a single Armstrong. The fortress artillery consists of six regiments. Prior to the outbreak of war the number of the Turkish troops in Bulgaria was estimated at 115,000 infantry, 3,000 artillery and 216 guns. In addition to this force there are 5,000 gendarmes in the fortresses of Varna, Shumla, Rastchuk, Silistria, Nikopolis, and Widin. The army in Bulgaria was distributed as follows: In Tulusha, 7,000; Silistria, 18,000; Rastchuk, 10,000; Varna, 8,000; Shumla, 18,000; Timova, 9,000; Nikopolis, 18,000; and in and around Widin, 55,000 and 144 guns. Since Saturday last considerable changes have occurred in the distribution of this force, several regiments having been sent down the Danube from Widin.

#### TURKISH NAVAL ARMAMENTS.

The war fleet of Turkey consisted, at the end of the year 1875, of 20 ironclad ships and 70 other steamers. The greater number of the ironclads were built in Great Britain. The two largest were the steamships Mesoudine and Mendouba, launched in 1874. These two ironclads are each of a burden of displacement of 9,000 tons and 332 feet long, with extreme breadth of 59 feet. They are built on the broadside principle, and have on the main deck a battery 148 feet long containing 12 18-ton guns, throwing 400 pound shot. The bow is strongly fortified and fitted with a ram of great strength, adapted to pierce an opponent below the armor in the most vulnerable part. The armor is from 10 to 12 inches thick throughout. There are six 20-pounders on the upper deck.

Among the other ironclads the largest is the frigate Osmanli, a ram, armor-plated from stem to stern, 309 feet long, 56 feet broad, and a burden of 4,200 tons. Two other notable ironclads are the twin screw steamers Aho Hah and Muin Zaffer. Each of these vessels is 230 feet long, and 36 feet broad, and of a burden of 1,400 tons. Both are clad in heavy armor, of an average thickness of 5½ inches, and carry four twelve-ton rifle Armstrong guns, in a central battery, the construction of which admits of the guns being fired ahead and astern without the aid of a turret. These two ironclads are stated to possess the highest speed of any vessels of war of the same tonnage. The Turkish navy was manned in 1875 by 30,000 sailors and 4,000 marine troops. The time of service in the navy is eight years.

#### THE NAVAL STRENGTH OF RUSSIA.

Great progress has been made in the strength and efficiency of the Russian navy. It consists of two great divisions—the Baltic and Black Sea fleets. Each of these two fleets is again subdivided into sections, of which three are usually stationed in or near the Black Sea. The Mediterranean section is now in American waters. In March, 1876, the strength of the Russian navy was returned as follows: 1. The Baltic fleet, 77 men-of-war. 2. The Black Sea fleet, 9 men-of-war. 3. The Caspian Sea fleet, 5 paddle-wheel steamers and 3 dispatch boats. 4. The Siberian fleet, 11 ships. The total comprises 108 men-of-war, 1,477 officers, and 7,217 seamen, exclusive of small squadrons in the White Sea and Sea of Aral. The ironclad fleet included in the foregoing statement comprised in March, 1876, the following vessels:

Number.	Ironclads.	Dispatch boats.	Other.	Total.
1	1	1	1	3
2	2	2	2	6
3	3	3	3	9
4	4	4	4	12
5	5	5	5	15
6	6	6	6	18
7	7	7	7	21
8	8	8	8	24
9	9	9	9	27
10	10	10	10	30

The most powerful Russian ironclad is the masted turret-ship Peter the Great, built at Cronstadt and launched in 1874. It carries two turrets with an armament of four 35-ton guns, made of Krupp steel. Next to this great ship the largest of the other ironclads are the three armored frigates, the Sevastopol, the Kniaz-Podarski, and the Duke of Edinburgh. The Sevastopol is 300 feet long and 52 feet wide. Her plates are 4½ inches thick, fastened to a double coating of teak of from six to nine inches thick. In view of war, changes have been made in the disposition of the fleet. According to a recent account the Russian

fleet in the Black Sea now consists of two circular monitors, four screw corvettes, seven paddle steamers, and four gunboats with an armament of 102 guns. This naval force, of course, is considerably below the strength of the Turkish fleet, each vessel of which is aloft in or near the Black Sea. In the Baltic the Russian fleet, according to the same report, consists of 29 ironclads, 66 unarmored steamers, and a number of smaller and weaker vessels, representing a total of 223 ships, with 20,000 men and 561 cannon. This fleet, or part of it, has received orders for putting to sea. There are also other indications of an intention to send at least a part of the Baltic fleet into Mediterranean waters.

#### THE RUSSIAN ARMY.

The organization of the Russian army is simple and efficient. Under the law which went into force five years ago, there is an annual conscription to which all men over 21 are subject. The period of service is 15 years, six being spent with the regiment and nine in the reserve. The men remain with the force at its full complement, and during the remaining period they are sent on furlough. It follows from this system that every man in Russia capable of military duty is a soldier. After acquiring themselves of their six years' service, the soldiers pass into the reserve for another period of nine years, during which they are liable to serve only in time of war. The law does not apply to the Cossacks and other irregular troops, numbering about 129,000. Last year the strength of the Russian army, on a peace footing, was as follows: Battalions, 852; squadrons, 281; guns, 1,422; officers, 33,013; rank and file, 732,829, making a total force of 769,872 men. Placed on a war footing, the strength of this army would be 1,213,250 men, including 39,380 officers. The strength of the various divisions of the Russian army, according to an official return, was as follows in 1874. The same relative proportions still probably exist between each arm of the service:

Peace footing.	War footing.
Infantry.....	685,111
Cavalry.....	138,000
Artillery.....	47,731
Engineers.....	15,413
Total.....	886,255

#### THE CHICO ARSON TRIALS.

SAN FRANCISCO, April 24.—A dispatch from Oroville says: John Mahoney, another of the Chico incendiaries was on trial yesterday and to-day. Two of the slaughter boys, his alleged companions in the crime, who had made confessions implicating the defendant, denied their sworn statement, and the jury found a verdict of "Not guilty." James Fay was then placed on trial, and was convicted of arson in the second degree. This closes the trials for arson, six in number, all the accused being either convicted or pleading guilty, with the above exception. The murder cases will follow.

#### NAVAL INTELLIGENCE.

WASHINGTON, April 25.—Ensign William E. Wright and John G. N. Schell have been ordered to the training ship Constitution. The President has accepted the resignation of Second Lieutenant Robert Wheeler, 1st Artillery, and has appointed to the grade of First Lieutenant, Chief of the Bureau of Yards and Docks at the Navy Department, has been promoted to the grade of Rear Admiral, in place of Rear Admiral John J. Almy, whose name was placed on the retired list yesterday. An account of his long and able service has been published in the official organ of the Navy. He has also been a detached from duty as President of the Board to Examine Officers for Retirement or Promotion, and a commander of the ship to be ordered to duty as a member of the board to fill the vacancy.

## THE OPENING CAMPAIGN.

### SKIRMISHING BEGUN.

#### BESSARABIA AND THE CRIMEA DECLARED IN A STATE OF SIEGE—THE MONTENEGRINS FIGHTING—THE RAILROADS OCCUPIED BY THE RUSSIANS.

ST. PETERSBURG, Wednesday, April 25, 1877.

An imperial order was promulgated to-day declaring Bessarabia, the littoral district of Kherson, and the Provinces of Taurida and Crimea in a state of siege. CONSTANTINOPLE, Wednesday, April 25, 1877. Salvat Pasha, in reply to the manifesto of the Czar, has sent a long circular dispatch to the Great Powers. It protests against a declaration of war, pointing out the efforts of Turkey to improve the position of the Christians and satisfy the demands of the Powers. In the absence, therefore, of any provocation on the part of Turkey, Salvat Pasha declares the Porte is at a loss to understand Russia's attack, and consequently appeals to the Treaty of Paris and the mediation of the Guaranteeing Powers. Skirmishing is reported to have commenced between the Russian and Turkish outposts on the Asiatic frontier, near Kars.

The Turkish papers to-day state that Sultan Pasha has passed through the Duga defile, after repulsing the Montenegrins, and is now marching to Nicosia.

RAGUSA, Wednesday, April 26, 1877. Prince Nicholas of Montenegro and his staff have gone to the Albanian frontier.

ODESSA, Wednesday, April 25, 1877. Ships arriving here will be boarded at the Middle Fountain. The master and crew will be obliged to go below, and a Russian crew will navigate the ship to or from Odessa.

LONDON, Wednesday, April 25, 1877. A Vienna dispatch to The London Times says: "It is reported that the contracts made by the Russians in Roumania do not indicate any intention on the part of Russia to send the whole army immediately to the Danube, but show that it is possible an opportunity for negotiations between Russia's first overture at crossing the Pruth and her final attempt to force the passage of the Danube will be given the Powers."

A Reuters telegram from Constantinople says the Russians have crossed the frontier of Asiatic Turkey at Alexandropolis, on the road to Kars. No hope is entertained in Constantinople that mediation of the Powers would be successful at the present stage.

Kent's dispatch from Cattaro announces that the Montenegrin forces are advancing toward the frontier of Albania. The Miridites, fearing they might be surrounded by 14 Turkish battalions and 2,000 Bashibazouks, have abandoned their positions, which were occupied by the Turks on Sunday.

Moscow, Wednesday, April 25, 1877. After the promulgation of the Czar's manifesto the municipality voted funds to provide 1,000 beds for the wounded and an additional million for medicines for hospital appliances. They subsequently appointed a special committee to draw up an address to the Czar. A solemn service was held in all the churches of the city.

BELGIS, Wednesday, April 25, 1877. The North German Gazette says the firm basis of the alliance of the three Emperors for the peace of the Continent is not shaken even now. It will now have to stand the real test of localizing the conflict, which might otherwise assume the character of a general war.

In the Chamber of Deputies to-day several Christian members protested against Russia's assertion that she declared war for the protection of the Christians in Turkey. They declared they did not desire the protection of Russia. The Christians were ready to take part in the defense of the country.

The leading evening journals and The Times, Debate, and Monitor entered consider the only object of Von Moltke's speech was to induce the Reichstag to vote the desired grant.

### THE SPIRIT OF THE LONDON PRESS.

#### RUSSIA HEARTILY CONDEMNED—DISAPPOINTMENT AT THE MANIFESTO.

The London press unanimously condemns the Russian manifesto. Even The Daily News, which is most favorable to Russia, says:

"We have to deal with a Russia whose policy, better or worse, involves mischief. It has tended to drive back our influence and for a more tangible and self-seeking end. The solitary action of Russia will almost necessarily be an onerous one to Russian interests. The best hope of the Turkish Christians is the poor one of transference from Turkey to Russian despotism."

The Times (Independent) says:

"Russia has hastened to stop all further negotiations and to act as if she had no interest in the tranquillization of Turkey; thus she has forfeited any right to speak in the name of Europe. Nor has she given the world any assurance that she has a right to expect. Nothing is said in the same strain as in the Livadia declaration that Russia had no annexationist objects. It would doubtless be rash to say that this declaration would necessarily be regarded as a sincere one, but it is at least a promise of sincerity. The best hope of the Turkish Christians is the poor one of transference from Turkey to Russian despotism."

Several French and English papers also comment on the absence of any disavowal of the Livadia declaration. The Standard (Conservative) considers the omission a serious mistake, and expresses the opinion that the declaration is a mere pretext for a more ambitious policy. It considers that the attempt of the manifesto to throw the responsibility of war upon Europe is beneath notice, and says: "Never was there a more unfortunate specimen of imperial policy."

The Daily Telegraph (Pro-Turkish) says:

"We have been tricked and duped by Turkish diplomacy, but in policy and action we shall not be so easily deceived. We shall not allow ourselves to be misled by the national interests. The nation will unanimously support whatever measure the Government may judge necessary for the maintenance of the Turkish Empire."

The Standard (Administration organ) says:

"The conduct of a despotic and overbearing Empire will be resented by every free people. For ourselves we may safely affirm that we shall not look on patiently while the Cossack hordes sweep across the Turkish Empire and bar our own road